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Seminal works on growth theory had mainly focused on exogenous technological change, where a 
certain given path of technological change was considered. At the end of the 1980s, a new growth 
theory emerged allowing for the endogeneity of technological change, where economic agents can 
affect  the  pace  of  technological  change  and  where  technology  is  essentially  interpreted  as 
“knowledge”. The present paper aims to develop a simple endogenous growth model to study the 
effects  of  taxation  on  dirty  intensive  resources  and  the  effects  of  subsidies  on  clean/ecological 
intensive resources. It also intends to analyse how exogenous environmental quality can affect the 
development of better quality (environmentally cleaner) inputs to production. For that, a dynamic 
general equilibrium growth model is considered based on the endogenous skill biased technological 
change literature. It is shown that final good sector bias is caused by the technological knowledge 
bias, which is promoted by government intervention. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to implement an analytical instrument capable of assessing the impact of clean 
and dirty technologies, as well as of energy/environmental policies on the production structure. It 
also intends to study how such policies can affect economic growth. For that, a dynamic general 
equilibrium  growth  model  is  considered  based  on  the  endogenous  skill biased  technological 
change literature (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002). 
Seminal works on growth theory had mainly focused on exogenous technological change, 
where a certain given path of technological change was considered. At the end of the 1980s, a 
new  growth  theory  emerged  allowing  for  the  endogeneity  of  technological  change,  where 
economic agents can affect the pace of technological change and where technology is essentially 
interpreted as “knowledge” (e.g., Vollebergh et al., 2005). 
Economic activities are mainly based on energy intensive sectors, but no power source is 
entirely impact free. All energy sources give rise to some degree of pollution. The environmental 
impacts can, then, depend on how energy is produced and used, the fuel mix, the structure of the 
energy systems, the energy regulations and pricing structures. 
One of the major challenges for policy makers has been the definition and implementation 
of  sustainable  policy  schemes.  European  Union  programmes  on technological  change  aim  to 
stimulate  not  only  innovation,  in  general,  but  also  environmentally  friendly  technologies,  in 
particular. These technologies are assumed to yield a double dividend, by stimulating economic 
growth and generating fewer emissions. 
With  the  changing  concepts  of  technology  in  economic  theory  together  with  their 
implications for sustainability, attention has shifted to the link between environmental policy and 
the bias of technological change. Indeed, over the last 10 years economists have been stressing   3
the role of technological change in the analysis of energy, environmental and climate policy. One 
of the reasons, usually appointed for the disregard of the environment in models of endogenous 
growth is that incorporating environmental externalities and resource scarcity increases strongly 
their complexity. Thus, the early attempts have focused mostly on first generation models of 
endogenous  innovation  (e.g.,  Jones  1995),  where  growth  is  endogenous  but  technological 
knowledge progress is assumed exogenous. Thus, in that literature, environmental policy exerted 
only temporary effects on growth. However, the experience suggests that tighter environmental 
policies  induce  major  technological knowledge  advances  in  abatement  technologies.  In  an 
attempt to shed new light on these issues, around 1990 a large and growing number of new 
growth literature emerged, studying the traditional endogenous growth models in a framework 
where environment and non renewable resources are present and where environmental taxation 
effects  are  considered,  generating  novel  insights  concerning  the  energy/environment growth 
relation (e.g., Schou, 2000; Smulders and Nooij, 2003; Grimaud and Rougé, 2003). 
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996), for instance, extended the model of Lucas (1988) 
by  incorporating  two  “public”  inputs  to  production:  the  environment  and  the  abatement 
knowledge. The authors show that if environment acts mainly as a public consumption good, a 
reduced  pollution  level,  to  yield  amenities,  harms  the  productivity  of  man made  production 
factors, depressing growth. Conversely, if the environment acts mainly as a public input into 
production,  the  enhanced  quality  of  the  environment  improves  productivity,  offsetting  the 
adverse growth effect of lower pollution. Moreover, while the costs of a tighter environmental 
policy occur in the short run, the benefits arise only in the long run since it takes time for nature 
to recover and for new abatement technologies to be developed.
1 
                                                 
1 Other models with nature as an input include Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991), Gradus and Smulders (1993), 
Smulders and Gradus (1996), Elbasha and Roe (1996), Mohtadi (1996) and Xepapadeas (1997).    4
Peretto (2009), in turn, introduces the energy sector and studies the effects of a tax on 
energy  use,  but  ignores  the  specific  scarcity  problems  derived  by  the  use  of  non renewable 
resources. Under the assumption of no scale effects and that energy demand is inelastic, the 
author found that the tax has no effect on the steady state growth rate, though it has important 
transitional effects. Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996) consider a pollution tax, but not other 
distorting taxes. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), Greiner (2005) and Hettich (1998) consider 
both  a  pollution  tax  and  distorting  income  tax,  but  not  the  two  “public”  capital  stocks 
(environment and abatement knowledge). 
Fullerton  and  Kim  (2008),  in  turn,  combine  various  elements  from  prior  models  to 
construct a single endogenous growth model with endogenous determination of pollution and 
environmental  quality  as  well  as  accumulation  of  private  capital  and  pollution  abatement 
knowledge.  They  assume  three  assets  in  the  economy:  private  capital  (physical  and  human 
capital), public  abatement knowledge  (R&D)  and  the environmental  quality  (natural  capital). 
They show that with abatement more effective than actual pollution, having higher pollution tax 
may mean lower growth, even with higher welfare. They also show the conditions under which it 
has the opposite effects (higher growth but lower welfare). 
With the exception of Groth and Schou (2007), none of the aforementioned studies include 
the  non renewable  resource  in  the  “growth  engine”.  They  use  a  simple  general  endogenous 
growth model where the resource enters the “growth engine” to study the effects of different 
forms of subsidies and taxation on capital and resources. Unlike the typical results from partial 
equilibrium analysis, they found that a tax on capital gains on a non renewable resource stock is 
shown to be of rather importance for long run growth. The same is true for a time varying tax on 
resource  use.  These  results  also  contrast  with  the  general  belief  within  endogenous  growth 
literature  that  interest  income  taxes  hamper  growth,  whereas  investment  subsidies  promote   5
growth. The authors show that this conventional view rests on the growth models where non 
renewable  natural  resources  are  ignored,  but  does  not  go  through  when  the  non renewable 
resource is an essential input in the sector generating long run growth.
2 
The  present  paper  aims  to  develop  a  simple  endogenous  growth  model  where  both 
renewable  and  non renewable  resources  enter  in  the “growth  engine”  to  study  the  effects  of 
taxation on dirty intensive resources and the effects of subsidies on clean/ecological intensive 
resources. It is also intended to analyse how exogenous environmental quality can affect the 
development of better quality (environmentally cleaner) inputs to production.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Here, the 
final  goods,  the  intermediate  goods  and  the  R&D  sectors  with  government  intervention  are 
described, the individual’s behaviour and the  government balanced budget presented  and the 
equilibrium characterised. Section 3 analyses the steady state equilibrium and performs some 
comparative statics to study the impact of the economic policy tools on technological knowledge 
bias  and  on  final  good  sector  bias,  as  well  as  on  economic  growth.  Section  4  studies  the 
transitional dynamics and proceeds to some sensitive analysis and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
2.1 Overview 
A standard economic structure with endogenous Shumpeterian R&D growth theory (i.e., with 
vertical innovations) is considered. In line with Barro and Sala i Martin (2004, ch. 7) and Afonso 
(2008), it is considered an economy with three productive sectors: the final goods (FGs) sector, 
the intermediate goods (IGs) sector and the research and development (R&D) sector. 
In the perfect competitive FGs sector ecological  and dirty intensive goods are produced 
through one of two substitutable technologies: Ecological Technology (TE) or Dirty Technology 
                                                 
2 See Aghion et al. (1998), Brock et al. (2005), Smulders (2000, 2005) and Xepapadeas (2005) for recent reviews.   6
(TD). The TE is an environmentally friendly technology that contributes to reduce pollution (or 
energy/material  waste).  To  produce  with  TD,  FG  firms  use  dirty specific  IGs,  such  as  non 
renewable  resources,  namely  fossil  fuels.  By  contrary,  to  produce  with  TE,  FG  firms  use 
ecological specific  IGs,  such  as  renewable  resources.  Composite  (or  aggregate)  FG  can  be 
consumed, converted into quality adjusted IGs or directed to R&D activities. 
The R&D activities, which are also developed in a competitive market, can be influenced 
by government policies, in order to develop new designs or successful research to enhance the 
environmental quality of both ecological and dirty specific IGs, using the composite FG as the 
only input. 
The  IG  firms,  in  contrast,  have  monopoly  power  over  the  sales  of  their  environmental 
quality adjusted IG. Consequently, they can charge a price above marginal cost (MC), which can 
also be influenced by government policies. As there are always follower IGs firms performing 
R&D, at each time, the monopoly power is temporary and each leader firm is driven out of 
business by new successful research that eliminates its profit. 
Individuals decide between working with ecological technology (TE) and dirty technology 
(TD) and between consumption and savings. For simplicity, we assume that individuals with high 
ability perform better using ecological technology (E), while those with lower ability perform 
better using dirty technology (D). 
Since, this is a dynamic general equilibrium model, all markets clear throughout time. 
 
2.2. Final-Goods Sector 
Following Barro and Sala i Martin (2004, ch. 7), Afonso (2008) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
(2001), let’s consider that each FG  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ n  can be produced by Dirty (TD) or Ecological (TE)   7
technology. The former (latter) uses D (E) skilled (unskilled) labour together with a continuum 
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There is substitutability between technologies (TE and TD) and complementarity among inputs 
(between Dn and IGn
D and between En and IGn
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3 IGs are environmental quality adjusted. Thus, 
the expression for the n FG production function, at time t is: 



































1 , , , 1 , , ,  (1) 
AD (AE) is the exogenous productivity level that depends on the institutions, property rights, 
government services, cultural and geographical features, social conditions and polluted (clean) 
environmental quality. That is, AD (AE) is a negative (positive) externality of production resulted 
from a more polluted (cleaner) environmental quality. The integrals denote the contributions of 
the two types of IGs to the production. Each of the two IG terms includes an adjustment for the 
environmental quality, obtained with each successful research that is expressed by an exogenous 
constant  q>1.
4  The  term  k  represents  the  top  environmental  quality  rung  at  time  t  and  k(j,t) 
expresses the j
th IG upgrade until t. In turn, q
k(j,t)xn
(k,j,t) denotes the used quantity of the IG j 
adjusted by environmental quality and the exponent (1 α) is its share in final good production. 
The “additive separability” of the IG means that they are perfect substitutes.
5 
                                                 
3 Unlike our model, Comolli (2006) proposes a two sector neoclassical growth model with Cobb Douglas technology 
in the intermediate sector and fixed proportions technology in final good production, treating technological progress 
as exogenous. Additional references are Roseta Palma et al. (2010) that use the traditional Cobb Douglas production 
function, where all factors are essential but there are substitution possibilities, and England (2000) that emphasizes 
the complementarity of human made and natural capital in production. 
4 Since the quality grades are perfect substitutes to production, in equilibrium only the highest environmental quality 
(the last upgrade) of IG is used because even though it is more expensive, the productive gains are larger. Thus, there 
is no need for using the sum function in (1). 
5 The discoveries of new ecological varieties of IG do not make any of the existing ones obsolete and no particular 
IG is totally essential to production.   8
Expressions with exponent  ] [ 1 , 0 ∈ α  represent the D(E) type of labour share in production. 
It is also assumed that E skilled labour has an absolute productive advantage over D unskilled 
labour, guaranteed by e>d≥1. The relative productivity  advantage of either type of labour is 
captured by n and (1 n), which implies that D(E) is relatively more productive in FGs indexed by 
smaller  (larger)  n.  Consequently,  the  relative  advantage  of  TE  increases  with  index  n.  Since 
[ ] 1 , 0 ∈ n , at each time t, there is a competitive equilibrium threshold final good  n , endogenously 
determined, where the switch from one technology to the other becomes advantageous. 
The profit maximisation problem of the n
th FG producer, is as it follows: 
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Eq. (2) implies that the marginal product of each input must equal its price due to the 
presence of constant returns to scale. From the first order conditions (FOCs), we get for the case 
of [ ] J j , 0 ∈  that: 
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Eq. (3) is the demand for dirty specific IG j by the firm of the FG n produced with TD. This 
equation implies that FG firms demand more dirty specific IGs when their product price, pn, is 
higher, when labour level, Dn, and the environmental quality of the IGs, k(j,t), are greater and 
when dirty specific IGs prices, p(k,j,t), are lower. Substituting the IG demand functions for dirty 
and ecological specific IG j into the production function, (1), after some algebra, we obtain the 
supply of the n
th FG: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 

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where QD and QE are aggregate quality indexes that evaluate the technological knowledge in each 
range of IGs. Considering, now, the aggregate output of the economy, Y, it can be expressed by: 





























1 dn t Y ln exp dn t Y ln exp ln exp dn t Y t p t Y n n n n   (6) 
where, for simplicity, Y is assumed numeraire; i.e., its price is normalized at each t to one. All 
resources of the economy, i.e., the aggregate output, Y, can be used either in the production of 
intermediate goods, X, or in the R&D sector, RS, or in consumption, C; i.e., 
  Y(t) = X(t) + RS(t) + C(t)  (7) 
 
2.3. Intermediate-Goods Sector 
The IG sector supplies to the FGs firms different environmental quality adjusted inputs. From (7), 
and for simplicity, Y will be input in the production of IGs. The IG firm can buy one unit of Y at 
its marginal cost (MC) of production, which is assumed to be one, convert it into a new quality 
adjusted IG at no cost, and then sell it back to FGs firms (Barro and Sala i Martin, 2004, ch. 7); 
i.e., the IG producer transforms Y into an IG with better environmental quality at no cost. 
Like  the  FGs  producers,  the  objective  of  the  IGs  firms  is  to  maximize  their  profits. 
Following Romer (1990), the production of j requires a start up cost of R&D, which can only be 
recovered if profits at each date are positive for a certain time in the future. This is assured by a 
system  of  intellectual  property  rights,  known  as  patent law,  which  protects the  leader firm’s 
monopoly, while at the same time, almost without any costs, disseminates acquire technological 
knowledge to other firms. Consequently, the producer of the highest environmental quality of the 
j
th IG is a monopolistic competitor and his profit maximization problem is expressed by:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) t j k x t j k p t j k Max
t j k p , , 1 , , , ,
, , − = Π   (8) 
Because the production function of IGs is assumed to be identical to the aggregate FG, the 
MC of an IG will be equal to the MC of Y. As the FGs firms are perfect competitors, their MC   10
equals their price and so will the MC of IGs. That is, MC=1. Hence, the MC of producing an IG 
is independent of its quality level and it is identical across all j’s. Let’s consider, for instance, the 
dirty specific  IG  production,  [ ] J j , 0 ∈ .  Taking  the  first  derivative  of  ( ) t j k , , Π   in  respect  to 
price, ( ) t j k p , , , and setting it equal to zero (FOCs), we have the following price:
6 
  ( ) [ ]
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α −






, , , 0
p t j k p
t j k p J j
n ,  (9) 
The degradation of environmental quality is associated with pollution from the use of non 
renewable resources, namely fossil fuels. Thus, these resources should be discouraged in favour 
of less polluted ones, such as the renewable resources. It is in this context that the environmental 
policy  should  act.  In  the  literature,  there  is  a  conventional  wisdom  that,  from  an  efficiency 
perspective,  market based  instruments  are  preferred  over  command and control  instruments, 
since they equalize marginal abatement costs across firms and hence, yield statically efficient 
outcomes (e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1994). In addition, market based instruments are believed to 
be more effective in inducing technological change than command and control instruments as 
they  offer  a  permanent  incentive  to  use  less  of  environmental  commodity.  Thus,  it  will  be 
assumed the market based instruments (taxes and subsidies) as the government policy. 
Assuming, then, that the government can subsidise (tax) the ecological (dirty) specific IG j 
by paying (charging) an ad valorem fraction, sx (τx), of each firm’s cost, the after subsidy (tax) 
marginal cost of producing j is (MC+ϕx), that is, (1+ϕx), where ϕx denotes subsidies ( sx) or taxes 
(τx).
7 Thus, the profit maximization price of the monopolistic IG firms, (9), yields ( ) ( ) α ϕ − + = 1 / 1 x p . 
Note that being 0<α<1 and sx<α, the monopoly pricing is always a mark up on the after subsidy 
MC=( x s − 1 ), since ( ) ( ) α ϕ − + = 1 / 1 x p >MC=( x ϕ + 1 ). If there is no change in government intervention, 
                                                 
6 For ecological specific IG production,  ] ] 1 , J j∈ , the price is the same. 
7 Since subsidy and tax rates are relatively stable over t, we consider that they are stationary and exogenously given.   11
this price is a constant mark up over t, across j and for all quality grades k. The closer α is to 
zero, the smaller is the mark up, meaning that there is less room for monopoly pricing.
8  
Each unit of the best environmental quality good is equivalent to q units of the following 
best environmental quality good. If the top environmental quality grade is priced at ( ) ( ) α ϕ − + 1 / 1 x ,  
then a good of the next top environmental quality grade could be sold at most at ( ) ( ) α ϕ − + 1 / 1 q x . If 
( ) ( ) α ϕ − + 1 / 1 q x <(1+ϕx), the next best environmental quality producer (and all lower environmental 
quality producers) cannot compete against the leader’s monopoly price and the monopoly pricing 
will prevail. However, if  ( ) ( ) α ϕ − + 1 / 1 q x ≥(1+ϕx), the providers of IGs can engage in Bertrand 
competition  (Grossman  and  Helpman,  1991,  chap.4).  In  this  case,  the  environmental  quality 
leader employs a limit price strategy, a price that is sufficiently below the monopoly price so as 
to make it just barely unprofitable for the next best environmental quality to be produced; This 
limit pricing is: 






1 x   (10) 
If the  leader  prices  at  a  price slightly  below q(1+ϕx),  for  example q(1+ϕx) ε,  then  the 
closest follower can charge at most (1+ϕx) ε/q, a price that results in negative profit and the 
lower  environmental  quality  goods  are  again  driven  out  of  the  market.  Thus,  if 
( ) ( ) α ϕ − + 1 / 1 q x ≥(1+ϕx), the limit pricing will prevail, so that the leader can successfully capture 
the whole market.
9 Plugging (10) and (5) into the demand functions for dirty and ecological 
specific IGs, it follows that their aggregate explicit demand functions become: 
                                                 
8  Indeed,  when  α=0,  monopoly  pricing  is  not  viable,  since  price  becomes  equal  to  MC  (typical  of  perfect 
competition). 
9 It is worth noting that regardless of the strategy (monopoly or limit pricing), the price of IGs is taken as given by 
the FGs producers, who are price takers.   12
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Accordingly, substituting (10) into (4), the production function of FG n turns out to be: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 

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1   (12) 
Like (4), (12) emphasises that the FGs production growth relies on the improvements on 
the available technological knowledge, QD and QE, on labour, Dn and En and on the exogenous 
environmental quality AD and AE. 
 
2.4. Equilibrium for a given aggregate quality indexes 
Generically, in equilibrium, only one technology, TD or TE will be used to produce each FG. 
Hence, there will be a threshold FG  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ n , such that only TD, Dn and dirty specific IG are used 
to produce FGs indexed by 0≤n≤n  (En=xn|j∈]J,1]=0, ∀ 0≤n≤ n ) and only TE, En and ecological 
specific IG are used to produce FGs indexed by n <n≤1 (Dn = xn|j∈[0, J] = 0, ∀ n <n≤ 1).
10 
In equilibrium, each labour type must be paid its marginal productivity, wD and wE, that 
must be equalised across all  [ ] n n , 0 ∈  ( ] ] 1 , n n∈ ).  
Nevertheless, wD and wE will only occur for all  [ ] n n , 0 ∈  and for all  ] ] 1 , n n∈ , respectively, if 
( ) n pn − 1
1 α  and  n pn
α 1  are constants (independent of n). Defining 
α 1
D p  as  ( ) n pn − 1
1 α  and 
α 1
E p  as 
n pn
α 1 , n  can be expressed in terms of price indexes of FGs: 
  ( )
α − − = n p p D n 1  and
α − = n p p E n   (13) 
Given the constructed indexes, when n= n  holds (i.e., when both a firm using TD and a firm 
using TE breakeven), the price indexes ratio of FGs produced with both technologies is: 
                                                 
10 In final goods with n≤ n (n>n ), firms using TD (TE) obtain zero profits, while a firm using TE (TD) would obtain 
negative profits. Thus, there is a threshold final good  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ n , where the switch from TD to TE is advantageous.   13





















  (14) 
From  (14)  and  since  0<α<1,  it  is  clear  that  there  are  stronger  incentives  to  develop 
technologies when the FGs produced by these technologies have higher prices. 
Given the supply of labour and the current state of technological knowledge, after some 
algebra, we find the threshold FG  n  that arises from the profit maximization of both perfectly 
competitive  FG  producers  and  monopolistic  IG  firms  as  well  as  from  the  full employment 










































  (15) 
This competitive equilibrium of  n  relies on the determinants of economic viability of both 
technologies; i.e., it relies on both the relative productivity,  ( ) d e , and prices of E and D labour 
type, as well as of IGs, due to the complementarity among inputs in production and it also relies 
on  the  relative  exogenous  environmental  quality,  ( )
α 1
D E A A .  The  determinants  for  the  relative 
productivity and prices of IGs are summarized in the aggregate quality indexes QD and QE. The 
ratio  D E Q Q B ≡  measures the (ecological) technological knowledge bias. Thus, with  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ n : 
                    (i) When QE=QD, then:                               (ii) When  ↑ B , then: 
       
Eq. (18) shows that when either a highly E biased technology, high  ( ) D E Q Q , or when there 
is a relative large supply of E labour, high  ( ) D E , or even when there is a large productivity 
advantage of E over D, high e/d, or when there is a large productivity advantage of the ecological 
exogenous environmental quality over the polluted one( ) D E A A , the fraction of FGs employing E 




1  0  0  1  Dirty 
Technology 
Ecological 
Technology    n    14
and using TE is large and  n  is small. Thus,  n  can be interpreted as a FG sector bias or a 
technology margin. From the previous statements, the price indexes can also be expressed in 
function of their determinants; indeed, since by definition,  ∫ =
1
0
1 ln exp n n d p , and considering (13) 
and (14), we get, after some algebra, that: 
  ( ) ( )
α α
− − − = n pE 1 exp  and  ( )
α α
− − = n pD exp   (16) 
Through (15), (16) can be rewritten in function of their determinants rather than in function 











































p   (17) 
From (17), small n  implies a small relative price of FGs produced with TE. As a result, the 
demand  for  E specific  IGs  is  low,  discouraging  R&D  activities  aimed  at  improving  their 
environmental  quality.  Thus,  labour  and  exogenous  environmental  quality  levels  affect  the 
direction of R&D (technological progress) through the FG price channel (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002). 
Finally,  we  can  determine  X  and  Y  either  in  function  of  both  their  determinants  or  in 
function of the threshold n . By definition,  ( ) ( ) ∫ ∫ + =
1
0
, , , ,
J
J
dj t j k X dj t j k X X , then through (11), (13) 
and (15) (16), the equilibrium of X in function of its determinants is given by: 
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α   (18) 
Accordingly, the equilibrium of the aggregate output, Y, in function of the threshold n or in 
function of its determinants, is given by: 



















α   (19) 
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2.5. R&D sector 
The incentive for follower firms to support R&D depends on the value of a patent, V(k,j,t), (the 
expected present value of the profits flow to the monopolist producer of IG j). This, in turn, 
depends on the given equilibrium interest rate, r, on the profits yielded at each time, Π(k,j,t), and 
on the expected duration of the flow, which depends on the expected duration of the monopoly 
power. This duration, in turn, depends on the probability of a new successful research, pb(k,j,t). 
In Schumpeter models with vertical innovation, the outcomes of R&D improve the quality 
of IGs and, consequently, the indexes quality in (5), while creatively destroying the profits from 
the previous improvement. Following Aghion and Howitt (1992), for a firm engaged in R&D, the 
instantaneous  probability  at t,
11  –  or  the  Poisson  probability  distribution  with  an  arrival  rate 
pb(k,j,t) –, of successful innovation in the next higher quality of IG j, k(j,t)+1, is: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j h M q q t j k rs t j k pb
t j k t j k 1 ,
1
1 , , , , ,
− − − = α ξ β   (20) 
where:  ( ) t j k rs , ,  is the flow of aggregate FG resources devoted to R&D in IG j at t and  ( ) t j k q
, β , 
with β>0, is the positive learning effect of accumulated public technological knowledge from 
past successful R&D in the IG j.
12 Thus, a greater β depicts a better innovation capacity (makes 
future learning easier) and  ( ) t j k q
,  denotes the higher quality level attained through innovation. 
Term 





− − , where ξ>0, is the adverse effect caused by the increasing complexity of 
quality improvements in j. As quality adjusted IGs become more complex, R&D is progressively 
more difficult, implying a lower instantaneous probability of success, which, ceteris paribus, 
                                                 
11 The instantaneous probability means that pb(k,j,t)dt is the probability that a certain firm will innovate during the 
time interval from t to t+dt, where dt is an infinitesimal increment of time. 
12 While this learning effect is a process of quality improvement by past successful R&D, the conventional learning 
by doing is usually formulated as the decline of production costs induced by cumulative experience of production.   16
increases the cost of R&D. Hence, ξ represents the fixed cost of R&D, where higher values of ξ 
are associated with a higher level of R&D difficulty.  
Since M=D if 0≤j≤J and M=E if J<j≤1, 
1 − M  is the adverse effect of market size. The 
difficulty in introducing new quality adjusted IGs and replacing old ones is proportional to the 
market  size,  due  to  coordination  among  agents,  processing  of  ideas  and  informational, 
organizational, transportation and marketing costs. As rents of leader firms are proportional to the 
market size, we assume that leader firms try to protect their economic rents by extending the 
expected  duration  of  their  monopoly  power,  that  is,  by  making  the  probability  of  the  next 
successful R&D more difficult (for example, through technical barriers). 
Term  h(j)  can  be  called  a  technological knowledge  absorption  effect.  It  captures  an 
absolute advantage of less polluted natural environment over more polluted natural environment 
in  implementing  advanced  technological  knowledge.  Cleaner  air  improves  health  and 
productivity of workers, and thus their capacity to adapt to new technological knowledge. The 
proposed specification for h(j) is: 





























A    (21) 
Profits at t for a j IG monopolist using a successful R&D of quality k relies on the mark up 
(after subsidies/taxes marginal cost) and on the demand for j by the FG producers. Formally, this 
occurs by solving (8) considering (11) and (13): 
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m=e  for  M=E  and  m=d  for M=D.  Thus, the  limit  pricing  of monopolistic  firms can  be  M 
specific, i.e., p(D)=q(1+τx,D) for 0 ≤ j ≤ J and p(E) = q(1 sx,E) for J < j ≤ 1. 
Eq. (26a) gives the incremental profits of follower firms taking over the leader position, 
while (26b) provides the incremental profits of leader firms replacing themselves. Comparing 
(26a) with (26b), the gain to a follower firm is greater, which is guaranteed by the assumption 
that q>1 and 0<α<1. It is worth noting that: (i) when the follower firm takes over the leader 
position, it goes from having no profits to having profits; (ii) due to complementarity in (1) the 
size of the market for ecological and dirty specific IGs is the employed E and D labour type. 
Thus, the scale effect, M, is apparent in the size of the profits in (26a). 
However, the most relevant factor is not instantaneous profits, but instead the expected 
present value of profits flow: 
  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) t k j pb t r
t j k






=   (23) 
This expression states that, the expected income generated by the successful research on 
rung k
th at time t,  ( ) t j k V , , ( ) t r , equals the profit flow,  ( ) t j k , , Π , minus the expected capital loss, 
( ) t j k V , , ( ) t k j pb , , , that will occur when the k
th rung is replaced by a new one. The denominator is 
the effective discount rate at the time of the successful research of rung k. It is equal to the 
interest  rate,  r(t),  plus  the  rate  of  Schumpeter’s  creative  destruction.  The  more  research  is 
expected to take place, the shorter the duration of the monopoly profits that will be enjoyed by 
the creator of the next successful research and, therefore, the smaller the pay off to innovating.  
Under free entry R&D equilibrium,  ( ) t j k , , Π =0 must hold and the expected returns must 
equal the spent resources. That is, at each time t, the expected reward for pursuing the (k+1)
th 
successful research, must equal the after subsidy cost of research. Hence, 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t j k rs s t j k V t k j pb r , , 1 , , 1 , , − = +   (24)   18
sr is a governmental ad valorem subsidy to R&D, which results in a reduction of R&D costs and 
can be M specific.
13 In this setting, the government can allocate its expenditures on R&D using a 
continuum of different policy rules, from the extreme symmetric rule (each M specific R&D 
activity gets the same) to the extreme asymmetric rule (only E or D specific R&D activity gets 
the subsidy). Thus, the limit pricing of the monopolistic firms can be M specific, i.e, with sr,D ≠ 
sr,E: p(D)=q(1 sr,D) for 0≤j≤J and p(E)=q(1 sr,E) for J<j≤1. 
From (20), (22a) and (23), the equilibrium M specific probability of successful R&D is: 
  ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )


































, ,   (25) 
Given the interest rate, r, and the FGs’ price indexes, pM, (25) turns out to be independent of 
IG j and quality rung k, due to the removal of scale of technological knowledge effects. That is, 
the positive influence of the quality rung on profits, see (22a), and on the learning effect, see (20), 
is exactly offset by its negative effect on the complexity cost, see (20). 
From (25), it is clear that R&D equilibrium rates respond negatively to the interest rate and 
to  an  increase  in  the  exogenous  given  tax  rate  of  D specific  IGs,  τx,D.  Conversely,  they  are 
encouraged both by an increase in the exogenous given subsidy rates of M specific R&D, sr,M, 
and of E specific IGs, sx,E. They also respond positively to the exogenous environmental quality, 
AM, and to the FGs’ price indexes, pM. Indeed, computing pbE pbD, it can be observed a dynamic 
price effect, which indicates that there will be stronger incentives to improve different types of 
technology when the goods produced by these technologies command higher prices. Thus, the 
                                                 
13 In our model, it is assumed that a subsidy to D R&D, fosters environmental improvement of dirty IGs converting 
them into less polluted IGs.   19
direction taken by technological knowledge progress is driven by the price channel and can be 
affected by the structure of government intervention.
14 
The first term on the right hand side of (25) is the rate of return from R&D. This rate of 
return must cover the ordinary rate of return, r, plus the premium for the probability per unit of 
time that a competitor will succeed, pb(k,j,t), and thereby drive the incumbent out of the business. 
Thus, if r is constant over t, then pb(k,j,t) is also constant, and so are all IGs of each M type. 
From (20) and (25), the equilibrium amount of resources devoted to the aggregate of R&D in 
each type of IGs, for each t, is 
  ( )
( )
( ) [ ] E E D D
t j k

















  (26) 
Eq. (26) shows that the aggregate resources devoted to R&D depend  positively on the 
aggregate quality indexes, QD and QE, and on market profitability, that is, on market size effect in 
R&D captured by M labour. Conversely, they depend negatively on both the interest rate, r, and 
on the experience adjusted cost of innovation. Since in equilibrium, the probability of successful 
research for all IGs of each M type, see (25), determines the speed of technological knowledge, it 
can be translated into the path of M type technological knowledge. Thus, the equilibrium M 



































,  (27) 
where [q




                                                 
14 This result is different from the skill biased technological change literature, which does not take into account the 
endogenous accumulation of human capital and which does not remove the scale effects. In contrast to what happens 
in our study, in this literature, the direction of technological knowledge progress is related with the exogenous 
increase in the skills supply, which induces faster upgrading of skill complementary technologies because under 
substitutability the market size effect dominates the price channel.   20
2.6. Consumption 
The  economy  is  assumed  to  have  a  time  invariant  number  of  heterogeneous  individuals, 
continuously indexed by  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ a , who decide the allocation of income between consumption of 
the aggregate FG and savings (lending in return for future interest). For simplicity, an exogenous 
threshold individual a  is considered, such that individuals with high ability a>a  are Ecological 
skilled, whereas individuals with lower ability a≤a  are Dirty skilled (i.e, unskilled).
15 
It is assumed a continuous time approximation of an overlapping generations model (e.g., 
Barro and Sala i Martin, 2004). The individual skills acquired rely on the family background, 
where it is assumed that parents are altruistic and leave everything to their children, including 
their  knowledge.  Thus,  each  individual  with  ability  a,  will  seek  to  maximize  the  following 
infinite horizon lifetime utility or felicity function with constant elasticity of substitution: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) dt t
t a c



















, where:  (28) 
( ) t a c ,   is  the  amount  of  consumption  of Y  by  individual a,  at  t;  ρ >  0  is  the  homogeneous 
subjective discount rate and θ  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
The intertemporal budget constraint of individual a, for all t≥0, is given by: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t a c a M t w t a K t r t a K M M w k , 1 , 1 , , − − + − = τ τ & , where:  (29) 
(i)  ( ) t a K , &  is the individual a savings, at t; (ii)  k τ  and  M w, τ  are per unit taxes on assets and wages 
respectively; (iii)  ( ) t a K , is the total asset holdings of individual a, at t, with return r. They are in 
the form of ownership of firms that produce IGs (and not in the form of public debt owned by 
individuals, as it is assumed that the government budget is balanced at every time); (iv) M=E if 
                                                 
15 The ability a, specific to each individual, can be viewed as the talent, the intelligence or the learning capacity this 
individual was born with and that can be developed during his/her life. It also defines implicitly his/her skilled type.   21
a>a   and  M=D  if  a≤a ;  (v)  Due  to  the  arbitrage  in  the  assets  market,  r  (the  premium  for 
postponing the consumption) depends only on t; (vi) M w  is the wage per unit of M type labour. 
Each individual seeks to solve an optimal control problem of maximization of the lifetime 
utility (28), subject to the budget constraint (29). The FOCs for both the control and the state 
variable must satisfy (29) together with the transversality condition, which guarantees that the 
limit value of the assets is zero. The obtained solution for the individual’s consumption path is: 





( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ρ τ
θ










, & & &    (30) 
This solution  is  the  standard  Euler  equation,  where  ( ) ( ) t c t c &   yields  the  growth  rate  of 
consumption for all individuals (independent of their ability). In the same way, C(t) stands for the 
aggregate consumption and  ( ) ( ) t C t C &  for its growth rate, assuming that population does not grow. 
Consumption growth rate relies on the difference between the interest rate after assets income 
tax,  ( ) ( ) t r k τ − 1 , and the rate of time preference, ρ, as well as on the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution,  θ 1  (the preference for substituting intertemporally). Low values of θ imply higher 
willingness to substitute temporally and thus, a bigger response of the consumption growth rate 
to  the  gap  between  ( ) ( ) t r k τ − 1   and  ρ .  This  gap  determines  whether  individuals  choose  a 
consumption pattern that rises, stays constant or falls over time. It is expected that ( ) ( ) t r k τ − 1 >ρ , 
and so that individuals choose a pattern of consumption that rises over time. That is, higher 
market interest rates induce individuals to save more at the present and spend more in the future. 
 
2.7. Government budget and aggregate resource constraints 
We assume that the government budget is balanced at each time, that is: 




0 , , , + = + + ∫ ∫ τ τ τ    (31)   22
The left hand side of (31) is government tax revenue from assets income,  ( ) ( ) t K t r k τ , from 
labour income,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] t D t w t E t w D E M + τ , and from an environmental tax on IGs that use dirty 
technology,  ( ) t X D x, τ .  The  right hand  side  is  government  expenditures  on  environmental 
subsidies for clean IGs (renewable resources) used by clean technology,  ( ) t X s E x, , and for R&D 
to enhance the environmental quality of both clean and dirty specific IGs,  ( ) t RS s M r, . 
Solving the budget constraint (7) for the aggregate consumption, C, and substituting Y, X 
and RS by (19), (18) and (26), respectively, we get that C is also a constant multiple of the 
aggregate  quality  indexes  and  labour  levels,  QDD  and  QEE;  i.e.,  C=f(QD,QE).  Hence,  in 
equilibrium, Y, C, X and RS are all constant multiples of the same variables. 
 
3. The Steady State Equilibrium 
The steady state equilibrium is a path where all variables either grow at a constant rate over time 
or are time invariant, such that each individual maximizes the lifetime utility, each FG, IG and 
R&D firm maximizes its profits, and all the markets clear. The dynamic equilibrium can be 
described by the path of the state of the two aggregate quality indexes towards the steady state. 
Since, in equilibrium Y, X, RS and C are all constant multiples of QE and QD, the stable and 
unique steady state endogenous growth rate, designated by  ( )
∗ ∗ ∗ ≡ ≡ E D g g g , is: 
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D & & & & & & & & & &
ρ τ
θ
  (32) 
Eq. (32) implies a constant steady state interest rate,  ( )
∗ ∗ ∗ ≡ ≡ E D r r r , obtained by setting the 
consumption  growth  rate  (30)  equal  to  technological knowledge  growth  rate  (27).  Then, 
∗ g  
arises from plugging 
∗ r  into (32). Also from (32), the steady state technological knowledge bias,   23
∗ B , remains stable, that is,( ) ( ) 0 = −
∗ ∗
E E D D Q Q Q Q & & . By equaling the steady state growth rates of 
QE and QD, it can also be found 
*
M p  and 
* n . 
By sx,E and sr,M government intervention positively affects 
∗ r  and hence 
∗ g . In fact, while 
sx,E increases the monopolistic profits, see (22a), acting as an incentive to R&D, sr,M falls the cost 
of R&D, see (24), increasing pbM, (27). Conversely, by τx,D and τK, government intervention 
negatively affects 
∗ r  and thus 
∗ g . Indeed, τx,D decreases the monopolistic profits, acting as a 
disincentive to R&D and τK decreases investment in R&D, due to the smaller expected marginal 
benefit. Since τw is absent in equilibrium conditions, it does not directly affect 
∗ g . 
 
 
4. Transitional Dynamics and Sensitivity Analysis 
We solve the model numerically to illustrate the effect of both government intervention and an 
increase in the positive externality of production derived from a cleaner environmental quality on 
the direction of technological knowledge and on the threshold FG. Using (27) and given that the 
interest rate, r, is always unique, the stability of the technological knowledge bias, B, is given by: 
 



























































































































































E & & &
  (33) 
Using the Matlab software to solve (33) and bearing in mind the baseline parameter values 
in Table 1, the technological knowledge’s time path, B, is displayed in Fig.1a and the threshold 
final good’s time path, n , is displayed in Fig. 2a. 
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Table 1. Baseline parameter values 
Parameter  Value  Parameter  Value 
AE  1.50  α  0.70 
AD  1.50  β  1.60 
e  1.20  θ  1.50 
d  1.00  ρ  0.02 
E  0.70  σ  2.00 
D  1.00  ξ  4.00 
q  3.33  sx,E, sr,E, sr,D τx,D  0.00 
Source: Authors’ assumptions based on theoretical framework and on the literature. 
 
For simplicity, in our model, public policies towards ecological technological knowledge 
are captured by both the subsidies sr,E and sx,E and the tax τx,D. This means that government 
intervention  can  produce  both  a  reduction  of  E R&D  costs  –  through  sr,E,  see  (24),  and  an 
increase of the profitability of producers of E type intermediate goods – through sx,E, see (22a), 
stimulating investment in E R&D. On the other hand, τx,D discourages investment in D R&D in 
favour of E R&D by decreasing the profitability of producers of D type intermediate goods. 
  Nine different cases are depicted: (i) sx,E, sr,E and τx,D increase to sx,E=sr,E=τx,D=0.2 (case 1); 
(ii) sr,E increases to sr,E=0.2 (case 2); (iii) sx,E increases to sx,E=0.2 (case 3); (iv) τx,D increases to 
τx,D=0.2  (case  4);  (v)  AE  increases  to  AE=2.10  (case  5);  (vi)  sx,E,  sr,E  and  τx,D  increase  to 
sx,E=sr,E=τx,D=0.2 and AE increases to AE=2.10 (case 6);  (vii) sr,E increases to sr,E=0.2 and AE 
increases to AE=2.10 (case 7); (viii) sx,E increases to sx,E=0.2 and AE increases to AE=2.10 (case 8); 
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                             Figure 1a                                                            Figure 1b 
        
                              Figure 1c                                                          Figure 1d 
      
                               Figure 1e                                                           Figure 1f 
       
Note: Transitional dynamics of: (a c) the technological knowledge bias, B, without exogenous increase in AE and (d 
f) the technological knowledge bias with exogenous increase in AE. 
 
                             Figure 2a                                                           Figure 2b 
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                              Figure 2c                                                           Figure 2d 
      
                               Figure 2e                                                           Figure 2f 
   
Note: Transitional dynamics of: (a c) the threshold final good,  n , without exogenous increase in AE and (d f) the 
threshold final good with exogenous increase in AE. 
 
Table 2 compares initial and steady state values of B and n  under the aforesaid nine cases. 
 
Table 2. Comparing initial and steady-state values of B and n . 















h  Case 9
i 
B  1  18.96  60.64  36.53  25.13  23.82  180.37  566.44  343.44  237.75  226.04 
n   0.52  0.20  0.12  0.15  0.178  0.18  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.052  0.054 
Note 1: 
a Case 1: sx,E=sr,E=τx,D=0.2 and sx,D=sr,D=τx,E=0.0; 
b Case 2: sr,E=0.2 and sx,E=sx,D=sr,D=τx,E=τx,D=0.0; 
c Case 3: 
sx,E=0.2  and  sx,D=sr,E=sr,D=τx,E=τx,D=0.0; 
d  Case  4:  τx,D=0.2  and  sx,E=sx,D=sr,E=sr,D=τx,E=0.0; 
e  Case  5: 
sx,E=sx,D=sr,E=sr,D=τx,Eτx,D=0.0 and AE=2.10; 
f Case 6: sx,E=sr,E=τx,D=0.2 and sx,D =sr,D=τx,E=0.0 and AE=2.10;  
g 
Case 7: sr,E=0.2 and sx,E=sx,D=sr,D=τx,E=τx,D=0.0 and AE=2.10; 
h Case 8: sx,E=0.2 and sx,D=sr,E=sr,D=τx,E=τx,D=0.0 
and AE=2.10; 
i Case 9: τx,D=0.2 and sx,E=sx,D=sr,E=sr,D=τx,E=0.0 and AE=2.10. 
Note 2: 
j Initial values of B and  n are the baseline steady state values of B and  n under no government intervention 
and  with  no  increase  in  positive  externality  of  production  derived  from  a  cleaner  environmental  quality. 
Nevertheless, unlike B, the initial value of  n  becomes 0.46 instead of 0.52 when an increase in positive 
externality of production derived from a cleaner environmental quality takes place. Thus, the initial value of 
n  is 0.52 in cases (1 4) and 0.46 in cases (5 9).    27
Fig. 1a and Fig. 2a show the baseline steady state values of, respectively B and n , under no 
government intervention and with no increase in positive externality of production.  
Fig. 1b and Fig. 2b show that an exogenous increase at t=0 in sx,E together with sr,E and τx,D 
accentuates, respectively the technological knowledge bias, B, and the final good sector bias,  n . 
Indeed, since greater sx,E increases the size of profits that accrue to the producers of E type IGs, 
and greater sr,E decreases the cost of E R&D, then an increase in sx,E and sr,E boosts the incentives 
to perform E R&D, thereby increasing the growth rate of the E specific technological knowledge. 
Furthermore, since greater τx,D decreases the size of profits that accrue to the producers of D type 
IGs, then an increase in τx,D discourages D R&D. Thus, until the new steady state, such bias 
increases the supply of E type IGs, increasing the number of FGs produced with E technology 
and decreasing  n , see (15). In turn, the relative price of E FG, see (14), lowers continuously 
towards the stable new steady state level. This implies that B is increasing, but at a falling rate 
until it reaches its new higher steady state, B
*=60.64 (from B
*
Baseline=B(t=0)=18.86), and that  n  
is decreasing, but at a falling rate until it reaches its new lower steady state, 
∗ n =0.12 (from 
∗ n Baseline=n (t=0)=0.20), as depicted in Table 2. 
Fig. 1c and 2c compare the baseline steady state values of B and  n , respectively with the 
increase of each type of subsidies and tax (sx,E, sr,E and τx,D). It is clear that sr,E is, by far, the one 
that most contributes to accentuate both technological knowledge bias, B, and final good sector 
bias, n . By contrary, τx,D, is the lesser contributor. 
Fig.  1d  shows  that  the  increase  in  the  exogenous  ecological  productivity  (AE),  clearly 
heightens  the  technological knowledge  bias  in  favour  of  E IGs.  Indeed,  the  technological 
knowledge absorption  effect  is  greater  than  in  the  baseline  scenario.  In  (21),  h(j)  jumps 
immediately from 2.25 to 3.01 as a result of a move from AE=1.50 to AE=2.10. Thus, as with   28
government intervention, but in this case with notably stronger magnitude, such bias increases 
the supply of E type IGs, thereby increasing the number of FGs produced with E technology and 
lowering  their  relative  price.  Thus,  relative  prices  of  FGs  produced  with  E technology  drop 
continuously towards the stable new steady state level, which implies that B is increasing, but at 
a falling rate until it reaches its new higher steady state, B* = 180.37, as depicted in Table 2. 
In turn, Fig. 2d shows that an increase in AE heightens the FG sector bias in favour of E 
FGs. However, an increase in AE also causes an instantly drop in  n  at time t=0, from  n Baseline= 
0.52  to  n =0.46.  This  immediate  fall  is  due  to  the  rise  in  the  supply  of  AE  without  new 
endogenous  technological knowledge  progress  and  thus  without  change  in  technological 
knowledge bias. Like in Fig. 1d, the increase in AE implies an increase in the number of FGs 
produced with E technology (n  diminishes) and consequently a decrease of the relative prices of 
those  FGs.  Nevertheless,  these  lower  prices  disincentive  the  development  of  E technologies 
which implies that n  is decreasing, but at a falling rate until it reaches its new lower steady state, 
∗ n =0.06 (see Table 2). Once in steady state, with a constant technological knowledge bias, 
∗ n  
remains constant. With a sufficiently strong technological knowledge absorption effect, as in the 
present case, the steady state 
∗ n  is smaller than under the baseline scenario, with no increase in 
AE, 
∗ n =0.06<
∗ n Baseline=0.20 (Table 2). 
Fig.  1(e f)  and  Fig.  2(e f)  present  the  same  behaviour  as  Fig.  1(b c)  and  Fig.  2(b c), 
respectively, but with stronger magnitude. 
As a result of the price channel, the path of B in Fig. 1(a c) and the path of  n  in Fig. 2(a c) 
are  strongly  smoothed  compared  with  the  path  of  B  and  n   in  Fig.  1(d f)  and  Fig.  2(d f), 
respectively. In fact, ceteris paribus, the exogenous increase of AE immediately increases the 
profits of the monopolistic producers of E specific IGs, (22), and thus, the demand for E R&D.   29
5. Conclusion 
In  line  with  Schumpeterian  growth  literature,  this  paper  provides  an  endogenous  non scale 
mechanism to link technological knowledge progress, technological knowledge bias, final good 
sector bias, government intervention and environmental quality bias. The essential idea is that the 
same  economic  forces  that  affect  the  technological knowledge  progress  will  also  shape  its 
respective bias and the final good sector bias. The technological knowledge bias and the final 
good sector bias are produced by the price channel, induced by government policy and by an 
increase in the positive externality of production derived from a cleaner environmental quality.  
As far as technological knowledge bias is concerned, it is only with the presence of the 
price channel that an increase in a subsidy to the production of E type intermediate goods and/or 
in a subsidy to E type R&D and/or in a tax to D type intermediate goods can strongly re direct 
R&D towards quality improvement of E type intermediate goods. In the same way, only with the 
price  channel  can  an  increase  in  positive  externality  productivity  expand  the  technological 
knowledge absorption effect, which, in turn, strongly fosters R&D towards quality improvement 
of E type intermediate goods. This increases the productivity of these intermediate goods, which 
diminishes the perfectly competitive domestic relative prices of final goods produced with the E 
technology. Thus, through the price channel, the technological knowledge bias is increasing but 
at a decreasing rate until it reaches its new higher steady state. 
Regarding the final good sector bias, the path of technological knowledge bias stimulates 
the relative number of E final goods, thereby decreasing the threshold final good. For the same 
reasons as for technological knowledge bias, final good sector bias is also accentuated by the 
price channel, induced by government intervention. It was found that an exogenous increase in 
positive  environmental  quality  causes  an  instant  drop  in  final good  sector  bias  due  to  the 
unchanged technological knowledge bias. From then onwards the transitional dynamics towards   30
the  constant  steady state  is  decreasing,  but  at  a  falling  rate,  since  the  lower  prices  of  the 
ecological intensive final goods, derived by the increase in the number of final goods produced 
with E technology, disincentive the development of E technologies and thus the number of E FG, 
Furthermore, with a sufficiently strong technological knowledge absorption effect, the steady 
state of the final goods sector bias is smaller than the previous one. 
 
Acknowledgements 
Mónica  Meireles  acknowledges  financial  support  from  FCT     Fundação  para  a  Ciência  e 
Tecnologia. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
References 
Acemoglu, Daron (2002), “Directed Technical Change.” Review of Economic Studies, 69, pp. 781 810. 
Acemoglu,  Daron  and  Fabrizio  Zilibotti  (2001),  “Productivity  differences.”  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics, 116(2), pp. 563 606. 
Afonso, Óscar (2008), “The impact of government intervention on wage inequality without scale effects”, 
Economic Modelling, 25(2), pp. 351 362. 
Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt (1998), Endogenous growth theory, MIT Press Cambridge, MA. 
Aghion,  Philippe  and  Peter  Howitt  (1992),  “A  model  of  growth  through  creative  destruction.” 
Econometrica, 60(2), pp. 323 352. 
Barro, Robert and Xavier Sala i Martin (2004), Economic Growth. 2
nd Edt. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press [1
st Edt.: New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1995]. 
Baumol,  William  J.  and  Oates,  Wallace  E.  (1994).  The  Theory  of  Environmental  Policy,  3
rd  ed., 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Bovenberg, Ary L. and Ruud De Mooij (1997), “Environmental tax reform and endogenous growth.” 
Journal of Public Economics, 63(2), pp.207 237.   31
Bovenberg,  Ary  L.  and  Sjak  Smulders  (1996),  “Transitional  impacts  of  environmental  policy  in  an 
endogenous growth model.” International Economics Review, 37(4), pp.861 893.  
Bovenberg, Ary L. and Sjak Smulders (1995). “Environmental quality and pollution augmenting technical 
change in a two sector endogenous growth model.” Journal of Public Economics, 57(3), pp.369 
391. 
Brock, William A. and Michael S. Taylor (2005), “Economic growth and the environment: a review of 
theory and empirics.” In Handbook of Economic Growth, P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (Eds.), North 
Holland, Amsterdam. 
Comolli, Paul (2006), “Sustainability and growth when manufactured capital and natural capital are not 
substitutable.” Ecological Economics, 60(1), pp. 157 167. 
Elbasha, Ellamin H. and Terry L. Roe (1996), “On endogenous growth: the implications of environmental 
externalities.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 31(2), pp. 123 146. 
England, Richard W. (2000), “Natural capital and the theory of economic growth.” Ecological Economics, 
34(3), pp. 425 431. 
Fullerton, Don and Seung Rae Kim (2008), “Environmental investment and policy with distortionary 
taxes, and endogenous growth.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 56(2), pp. 
141 154. 
Gradus, Raymond and Sjak Smulders (1993), “The trade off between environmental care and long term 
growth pollution in three prototype growth models.” Journal of Economics, 58(1), pp. 25 51. 
Greiner, Alfred (2005), “Fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model with public capital and pollution.” 
Japanese Economic Review, 56(1), pp. 67 84. 
Grimaud, André and Luc Rougé (2003), “Non renewable resources and growth with vertical innovations: 
optimum,  equilibrium  and  economic  policies.”  Journal  of  Environmental  Economics  and 
Management, 45 (2, supplement 1), pp. 433 453. 
Grossman,  Gene  M.  and  Elhanan  Helpman  (1995),  Innovation  and  growth  in  the  global  economy. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.   32
Groth, Christian and Poul Schou (2007), “Growth and non renewable resources: The different roles of 
capital and resource taxes.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 53(1), pp. 80 
98. 
Hettich,  Frank  (1998),  “Growth  effects  of  a  revenue neutral  environmental  tax  reform.”  Journal  of 
Economics, 67(3), pp. 287 316. 
Jones,  Charles  I.  (1995),  “R&D based  models  of  economic  growth.”  Journal  of  Political  Economy, 
103(4), pp. 759 784. 
Lucas, Robert E. (1988), “On the mechanics of economic development.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 
22(1), pp. 3 42. 
Mohtadi, Hamid (1996), “Environment, growth and optimal policy design.” Journal of Public Economics, 
63(1), pp.119 140. 
Peretto, Pietro F. (2009), “Energy taxes and endogenous technological change.” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 57(3), pp. 269 283. 
Romer, Paul M. (1990), “Endogenous technological change.” Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 
S71 S102. 
Roseta Palma, Catarina, Alexandra Ferreira Lopes and Tiago Neves Sequeira (2010), “Externalities in an 
endogenous growth model with social and natural capital.” Ecological Economics, 69(3), pp. 603 
612. 
Schou,  Poul  (2000),  “Polluting  non renewable  resources  and  growth.”  Environmental  and  Resource 
Economics, 16(2), pp. 211 227. 
Smulders, Sjak (2005), “Endogenous technological change, natural resources and growth.” In Scarcity and 
Growth  Revisited:   atural  Resources  and  the  Environment  in  the   ew  Millenium,  R.David 
Simpson, Michael A. Toman, Robert U. Ayres (Eds.), The Johns Hopkins University Press for 
Resources for the Future press, chapter 8.   33
Smulders, Sjak (2000), “Economic growth and environmental quality.” In Principles of Environmental 
and Resource Economics: A Guide for Students and Decision makers, H. Folmer and H.L. Gabel 
(Eds.), Edward Elgar Publishers, second ed., Celtenham, UK. 
Smulders, Sjak and Raymond Gradus (1996), “Pollution abatement and long term growth.” European 
Journal of Political Economics, 12(3), pp.505 532. 
Smulders, Sjak and Michiel de Nooij (2003), “The impact of energy conservation on technology and 
economic growth.” Resource Energy Economics, 25, pp. 59 79. 
Tahvonen, Olli and Jari Kuuluvainen (1991), “Optimal growth with renewable resources and pollution.” 
European Economic Review, 35(2 3), pp. 650 661. 
Xepapadeas, Anastasios (2005), “Economic growth and the Environment.” In Handbook of Environmental 
Economics, K. Maler and J. Vinvent (Eds.), vol. 3, North Holland, Amsterdam. 
Xepapadeas, Anastasios (1997), “Economic development and environmental pollution: traps and growth.” 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 8(3), pp. 327 350. 
Vollebergh, Herman R.J. and Claudia Kemfert (2005), “The role of technological change for a sustainable 
development.” Ecological Economics, 54(2 3), pp. 133 147. Recent FEP Working Papers 
 
Nº 377 
Nuno Torres, Óscar Afonso and Isabel Soares, “The connection between oil and 
economic growth revisited”, May 2010 
Nº 376 
Ricardo Correia and Carlos Brito, “O Marketing e o Desenvolvimento Turístico: O Caso 
de Montalegre”, May 2010 
Nº 375 
Maria D.M. Oliveira and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “The determinants of technology transfer 
efficiency and the role of innovation policies: a survey”, May 2010 
Nº 374 
João Correia-da-Silva and Carlos Hervés-Beloso, “Two-period economies with private 
state verification”, May 2010 
Nº 373 
Armando Silva, Óscar Afonso and Ana Paula Africano, “Do Portuguese manufacturing 
firms learn by exporting?”, April 2010 
Nº 372 
Ana Maria Bandeira and Óscar Afonso, “Value of intangibles arising from R&D 
activities”, April 2010 
Nº 371 
Armando Silva, Óscar Afonso and Ana Paula Africano, “Do Portuguese manufacturing 
firms self select to exports?”, April 2010 
Nº 370 
Óscar Afonso, Sara Monteiro and Maria Thompson, “A Growth Model for the Quadruple 
Helix Innovation Theory”, April 2010 
Nº 369 
Armando Silva, Óscar Afonso and Ana Paula Africano, “Economic performance and 
international trade engagement: the case of Portuguese manufacturing firms”, April 
2010 
Nº 368 
Andrés Carvajal and João Correia-da-Silva, “Agreeing to Disagree with Multiple Priors”, 
April 2010 
Nº 367  Pedro Gonzaga, “Simulador de Mercados de Oligopólio”, March 2010 
Nº 366 
Aurora A.C. Teixeira and Luís Pinheiro, “The process of emergency, evolution, and 
sustainability of University-Firm relations in a context of open innovation ”, March 2010 
Nº 365 
Miguel Fonseca, António Mendonça and José Passos, “Home Country Trade Effects of 
Outward FDI: an analysis of the Portuguese case, 1996-2007”, March 2010 
Nº 364 
Armando Silva, Ana Paula Africano and Óscar Afonso, “Learning-by-exporting: what we 
know and what we would like to know”, March 2010 
Nº 363 
Pedro Cosme da Costa Vieira, “O problema do crescente endividamento de Portugal à 
luz da New Macroeconomics”, February 2010 
Nº 362 
Argentino Pessoa, “Reviewing PPP Performance in Developing Economies”, February 
2010 
Nº 361 
Ana Paula Africano, Aurora A.C. Teixeira and André Caiado, “The usefulness of State 
trade missions for the internationalization of firms: an econometric analysis”, February 
2010 
Nº 360 
Beatriz Casais and João F. Proença, “Inhibitions and implications associated with 
celebrity participation in social marketing programs focusing on HIV prevention: an 
exploratory research”, February 2010 
Nº 359 
Ana Maria Bandeira, “Valorização de activos intangíveis resultantes de actividades de 
I&D”, February 2010 
Nº 358 
Maria Antónia Rodrigues and João F. Proença, “SST and the Consumer Behaviour in 
Portuguese Financial Services”, January 2010 
Nº 357 
Carlos Brito and Ricardo Correia, “Regions as Networks: Towards a Conceptual 
Framework of Territorial Dynamics”, January 2010 
Nº 356 
Pedro Rui Mazeda Gil, Paulo Brito and Óscar Afonso, “Growth and Firm Dynamics with 
Horizontal and Vertical R&D”, January 2010 
Nº 355 
Aurora A.C. Teixeira and José Miguel Silva, “Emergent and declining themes in the 
Economics and Management of Innovation scientific area over the past three decades”, 
January 2010 
Nº 354 
José Miguel Silva and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “Identifying the intellectual scientific basis 
of the Economics and Management of Innovation Management area”, January 2010 
Nº 353 
Paulo Guimarães, Octávio Figueiredo and Douglas Woodward, “Accounting for 
Neighboring Effects in Measures of Spatial Concentration”, December 2009 
Nº 352  Vasco Leite, Sofia B.S.D. Castro and João Correia-da-Silva, “A third sector in the core-periphery model: non-tradable goods”, December 2009 
Nº 351 
João Correia-da-Silva and Joana Pinho, “Costly horizontal differentiation”, December 
2009 
Nº 350 
João Correia-da-Silva and Joana Resende, “Free daily newspapers: too many incentives 
to print?”, December 2009 
Nº 349 
Ricardo Correia and Carlos Brito, “Análise Conjunta da Dinâmica Territorial e Industrial: 
O Caso da IKEA – Swedwood”, December 2009 
Nº 348 
Gonçalo Faria, João Correia-da-Silva and Cláudia Ribeiro, “Dynamic Consumption and 
Portfolio Choice with Ambiguity about Stochastic Volatility”, December 2009 
Nº 347 
André Caiado, Ana Paula Africano and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “Firms’ perceptions on the 
usefulness of State trade missions: an exploratory micro level empirical analysis”, 
December 2009 
Nº 346 
Luís Pinheiro and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “Bridging University-Firm relationships and Open 
Innovation literature: a critical synthesis”, November 2009 
Nº 345 
Cláudia Carvalho, Carlos Brito and José Sarsfield Cabral, “Assessing the Quality of 
Public Services: A Conceptual Model”, November 2009 
Nº 344 
Margarida Catarino and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “International R&D cooperation: the 
perceptions of SMEs and Intermediaries”, November 2009 
Nº 343 
Nuno Torres, Óscar Afonso and Isabel Soares, “Geographic oil concentration and 
economic growth – a panel data analysis”, November 2009 
Nº 342  Catarina Roseira and Carlos Brito, “Value Co-Creation with Suppliers”, November 2009 
Nº 341 
José Fernando Gonçalves and Paulo S. A. Sousa, “A Genetic Algorithm for Lot Size and 
Scheduling under Capacity Constraints and Allowing Backorders”, November 2009 
Nº 340 
Nuno Gonçalves and Ana Paula Africano, “The Immigration and Trade Link in the 
European Union Integration Process”, November 2009 
Nº 339 
Filomena Garcia and Joana Resende, “Conformity based behavior and the dynamics of 
price competition: a new rational for fashion shifts”, October 2009 
Nº 338 
Nuno Torres, Óscar Afonso and Isabel Soares, “Natural resources, economic growth and 
institutions – a panel approach”, October 2009 
Nº 337 
Ana Pinto Borges, João Correia-da-Silva and Didier Laussel, “Regulating a monopolist 
with unknown bureaucratic tendencies”, October 2009 
Nº 336 
Pedro Rui Mazeda Gil, “Animal Spirits and the Composition of Innovation in a Lab-
Equipment R&D Model”, September 2009 
Nº 335 
Cristina Santos and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “The evolution of the literature on 
entrepreneurship. Uncovering some under researched themes”, September 2009 
Nº 334 
Maria das Dores B. Moura Oliveira and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “Policy approaches 
regarding technology transfer: Portugal and Switzerland compared”, September 2009 
Nº 333 
Ana Sofia Ferreira, Leonídio Fonseca and Lilian Santos, “Serão os ‘estudantes 
empreendedores’ os empreendedores do futuro? O contributo das empresas juniores 
para o empreendedorismo”, August 2009 
Nº 332 
Raquel Almeida, Marina Silva and Tiago Soares, “Coesão Territorial - As relações de 
fronteira entre Portugal e Espanha”, August 2009 
Nº 331 
Custódia Bastos, Suzi Ladeira and Sofia Silva, “Empreendedorismo nas Artes ou Artes 
do Empreendedorismo? Um estudo empírico do ‘Cluster’ da Rua Miguel Bombarda”, 
August 2009 
Nº 330 
Filipe A. Ribeiro, Ana N. Veloso and Artur V. Vieira, “Empreendedorismo Social: Uma 
análise via associativismo juvenil”, August 2009 
 
 
Editor: Sandra Silva (sandras@fep.up.pt) 
Download available at: 
http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/  








































































































￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿